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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF HEALTH CARE
COST-CUTTING: TOWARD A
POSTNEOLIBERAL HEALTH-REFORM
AGENDA
FRANK PASQUALE*
I
INTRODUCTION
Neoliberals advocate for “marketization,” but the transition to markets in
pervasively regulated fields like health, defense, and education is complex.
There is no way out but through. The state itself must capitulate to (and
1
coordinate) its subjects’ purported emancipation from it. Thus a paradox
threatens the coherence of the thought of neoliberals. Wealth accumulation up
to now, they assert, has been distorted by various ill-considered or malicious
state interventions. Reform is imperative. But the past maldistribution of wealth
biases the present political playing field: tycoons who won crony capitalist
favors in the past are going to use those gains to influence future elections, and
in particular the future terms of marketization. So the neoliberal doubles down
publicly: as the contemporary political economist of laissez-faire, he insists that
legislative, regulatory, and cognitive capture just prove that the state needs to
be shrunk. Left un- (or less) spoken are the more critical questions: What parts
of the state are to shrink? And what is to be maintained, or grown, as the

Copyright © 2014 by Frank Pasquale.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. I am grateful to Jedediah Purdy and David Grewal
for organizing this symposium. I wish to thank members of the Association of Professors of Political
Economy and Law (APPEAL) and the Socioeconomics Section of the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) for inspiring methodological pluralism in law and economics. David Golumbia and
Jedediah Purdy offered very insightful comments on an early draft. Diane Hoffman, Robert Suggs,
Taunya Banks, and several other colleagues at the University of Maryland offered wise critiques of an
early version of the argument when I presented the paper at a summer workshop in Baltimore.
1. PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO TO WASTE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM
SURVIVED THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 69 (2013). Therein, Mirowski documents the neoliberal
pattern of
hav[ing] it both ways: to stridently warn of the perils of expanding purview of state activity
while simultaneously imagining the strong state of their liking rendered harmless…; to posit
their ‘free market’ as an effortless generator and conveyor belt of information while
simultaneously strenuously and ruthlessly prosecuting a ‘war of ideas’ on the ground; asserting
their program would lead to unfettered economic growth and advanced human welfare while
simultaneously suggesting that no human mind could ever really know any such thing.
Id.
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guarantor of a new market order?
Beneath the surface of state versus market rhetoric, the U.S. political
economy increasingly features battles between combined state-market sectors
2
over their respective shares of profits and power. As these “battles of the
sectors” wear on, one critical player—health care—appears to be on the verge
of an unconditional surrender in the marketplace of ideas. The imperative to
cut health care costs has become a background assumption in health law and
policy. It is something that not just nearly all mainstream economists, but all
serious policymakers, whatever their political views, tend to accept as a basic
ground of informed discourse. If health care has, as former acting director of
the Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Donald Berwick
maintains, a “triple aim” of quality, access, and cost control, it appears that the
3
last imperative is primus inter pares. Cost-cutting is a standard that liberals and
conservatives, libertarians and progressives are eager to rally around. In a
policy landscape riddled with irreconcilable differences over fundamental
values, cost-cutting is a unifying theme.
The critical question, though, is how to cut health care costs. Beneath the
superficial consensus that “health care is too expensive,” there are raging
debates on strategies of cost containment. Some favor supply-side limits: for
example, reducing the quantity or price of providers. Others focus on the
demand side: how to reduce expenditures on health care (by, say, removing the
tax exemption for employer-provided health insurance or imposing taxes on
certain insurance). A growing “quality movement” argues that “pay for
performance” will reduce costs by shifting spending to effective interventions,
and away from wasteful ones.
How much should our society spend on health care? That is a deep and
difficult, political and economic (and fundamentally politico-economic)
4
question. Yet it ought to be addressed before policymakers point to high health
care spending in itself as a rationale for reducing the purchasing power of
patients, reducing compensation of physicians, nurses, and other providers, or
deterring investment in hospitals, drugs, and devices.
Even if policymakers frankly accept a health expenditures goal along the
lines of “the same percentage of GDP as other advanced industrial economies,”
there is critical conceptual work to be done before pursuing it. Before imposing

2. As Grewal and Purdy explain in their introduction to this issue, “The questions that
neoliberalism addresses, then, are not ‘how much market,’ or ‘how much governance,’ but which
interests will enjoy protection. . . .” David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and
Neoliberalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 8–9.
3. See Donald M. Berwick, et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759,
759–69 (2008).
4. For a definition of political economy and its relevance to law, see Frank Pasquale, Capital’s
Offense: Law’s Entrenchment of Inequality (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2014)), BOUNDARY 2 REVIEW, Oct. 1, 2014, at 2, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520251.
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blunt instruments of cost containment like vouchers and changed tax treatment
of insurance, policymakers need to evaluate which subsectors within the health
sector are undervalued and which are overvalued. It makes little sense to aspire
to cut health expenditures in general, particularly if those that are now absent,
undersupplied, or undercompensated are worth, in the aggregate, more than the
waste now being paid for. Far too many policy discussions proceed on the
assumption that (1) waste is easy to identify, (2) once identified, there are tools
available to deter spending on it, and (3) deterring spending on waste will lead
to reallocation of that spending to either worthier health spending, or worthier
spending in the economy as a whole. Only on rare occasions do all these
assumptions clearly hold.
To develop a more rigorous approach to cost containment, this essay
proceeds as follows: Part II examines the fundamental conflict that costcontainment papers over—namely, whether American health expenditure
exceptionalism is a result of inadequate or excessive implementation of
marketization and the profit motive. Parts III and IV call for a more textured
analysis of health care expenditures to encourage a revaluation of aspects of
health care that are now scarce (thanks in part to inadequate compensation for
them). Part V concludes with some reflections on how winners of past conflicts
on health care governance parlay money into power (and power into money).
They have shaped a consensus for cost-cutting while obscuring the many ways
their dominance has impeded quality of care and access to medicine and may
raise costs in the future.
II
MARKETS AS CURE OR CAUSE OF U.S. HEALTH EXPENDITURE
EXCEPTIONALISM?
5

American health care is uniquely expensive. For example, U.S. doctors may
be overeager to deploy advanced imaging technology. Others spread the blame,
lamenting an insufficient evidence base for a surprisingly high percentage of
care. In her book Overtreated, Shannon Brownlee argues that the U.S. health
care system spends “between one fifth and one third of our health care
6
dollars . . . on care that does nothing to improve our health.” Brownlee’s
5. Jonathan S. Skinner, The Costly Paradox of Health-Care Technology, in Business Reports: A
Cure for Health-Care Costs, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept 5. 2013), available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/518876/the-costly-paradox-of-health-care-technology.
Unlike many countries, the U.S. pays for nearly any technology (and at nearly any price)
without regard to economic value. For this reason, since 1980, health-care spending as a
percentage of gross domestic product has grown nearly three times as rapidly in the United
States as it has in other developed countries, while the nation has lagged behind in lifeexpectancy gains.
Id.
6. SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US SICKER
AND POORER 27 (2008).
In the latter part of the twentieth century, dozens of common treatments, including the
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careful work builds on health services research that suggests a number of places
where American health systems could improve outcomes while cutting costs.
On the other hand, there are certain convenient narratives about American
costs that need to be debunked. For example, some scolds claim excess
utilization of health care in the United States is driving costs. But Americans do
not use more physician or hospital services than, say, the Germans or the
7
French (both nations with significantly lower per capita health expenditures).
Rather, the most significant culprit behind exorbitant health care costs is high
prices, not overutilization. As one study showed, the “[p]rice of professional
services, drugs and devices, and administrative costs, not demand for services or
aging of the population, produced 91 percent of [health care] cost increases
8
since 2000.” Doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical firms all make more money
9
in the United States than in any other comparable country. Advocates for
single-payer, nationalized health care have pointed out that the United States’
per capita public spending on health care would pay for all per capita health
10
spending in nearly any other advanced industrial nation. Drugs, devices,
hospital services, and the time of most physicians are markedly more expensive
11
in the United States than in most of Europe.
A naïve defense of U.S. health costs might simply take the high prices as
evidence that Americans prefer to allocate the per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) that the United States produces, beyond that produced in
similar countries, on health care. For example, in 2012, the United States’ per
capita GDP was $51,689; it was only $41,923 in Germany and $42,114 in
12
Canada. In 2011, per capita health expenditures in the three countries were
tonsillectomy, the hysterectomy, the frontal lobotomy, the radical mastetctomy, arthroscopic
knee surgery for arthritis, X-ray screening for lung cancer, proton pump inhibitors for breast
cancer, to name just a few, have ultimately been shown to be unnecessary, ineffective, more
dangerous than imagined, or sometimes more deadly than the diseases they were intended to
treat.
Id.
7. DAVID A. SQUIRES, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, EXPLAINING HIGH HEALTH CARE
SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SUPPLY, UTILIZATION,
PRICES, AND QUALITY 4–5 (2012), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/May/1595_Squires_explaining_high_hlt_care_spending_intl_brief.pdf.
8. Maggie Fox, What makes U.S. Health Care So Overpriced? It’s Not What You Think, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/what-makes-u-s-healthcare-so-overpriced-its-not-f2D11582695 (quoting a study by Hamilton Moses of the Alerion Institute
and Johns Hopkins University).
9. Ezra Klein, Why an MRI cost $1,080 in America and $280 in France, WASH. POST (Mar. 3,
2012, 12:08 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/why-an-mri-costs-1080-inamerica-and-280-in-france/2011/08/25/gIQAVHztoR_blog.html.
10. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance—And
Not Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 92–93 (2002).
11. Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Varduhi Petrosyan, It's The Prices, Stupid: Why The
United States Is So Different From Other Countries, 22(3) HEALTH AFFAIRS 89, 91 (2003).
12. Gross domestic product (expenditure approach)—Per head, US $, current prices, current PPPs,
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, (May 25, 2014),
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$8,508, $4,495, and $4,522, respectively. It is not unimaginable that $4,000 of
that roughly $10,000 gap would rationally be spent on the health sector. It is
hard to enjoy much else if one’s health is poor.
On the other hand, the typical patient in the United States is not obtaining
demonstrably better outcomes in exchange for the extra spending. U.S. life
expectancy is about the same as that prevailing in countries like Canada and
Germany. Other aspects of quality of care (such as wait times for doctors) are
14
not noticeably better in the United States either. So it is hard to excuse the
higher U.S. expenditures as the cost of quality. Nor do they appear to reflect
direct consumer choice, given that so much health spending is involuntary (no
one chooses to get sick) and is channeled through third-party payers.
The mediation of most health care spending in the United States—by
physicians (who stand between patients and treatment options), insurers (who
stand between patients and doctors), and employers and government entities
(who stand between patients and insurers)—leads to a fundamental divide on
the explanation of higher U.S. costs. For mainstream American economists, the
central problem is that government regulation and subsidies distort the
15
outcomes that a “normal” market would provide. Victor Fuchs (an academic
“sometimes called the dean of American health care economists,” according to
New York Times economics journalist David Leonhardt) frequently evokes
what he takes to be normal market goods as comparators for health care. “If
there were third-party payments for personal computers, expenditures for PCs
would surely be greater than at present. Even if consumers did not purchase
more computers, many would be tempted to purchase top-of-the-line models,”
Fuchs argues, in an article meant to explain why health care expenditures are
16
inappropriately high. That leads to even more of what he deems distortions to
“offset overutilization of health care” by imposing constraints like “fixed
budgets for hospitals and physicians, quantitative limits on supplies of personnel
17
and facilities, and alternative payment mechanisms such as capitation.”
Conventional economists tend to derogate these tactics, which they see as
troubling deviations from ideal-typical free markets. In their place, they

http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=218.
13. OECD Health Data 2014—Frequently Requested Data, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2014).
14. Karen Davis, Kristof Stremikis, David Squires, & Cathy Schoen, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,
2014 Update: How the U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND (June 16, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2014/jun/mirrormirror.
15. The scare quotes around the word “normal” are meant to denote the diversity of arrangements
commonly called “markets.” There are standard markets for given commodities and services, but it is
very difficult to identify underlying unities for all such markets.
16. Victor Fuchs, Health Care Is Different—That’s Why Expenditures Matter, 303 JAMA 1859,
1859 (2010).
17. Id.
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propose various mechanisms (such as vouchers or health savings accounts)
designed to bring American health care closer to what they deem a true market.
Far less represented in American health policy debates are comparative
health law scholars who locate American health expenditure exceptionalism
precisely in its health care system’s more market-oriented—or, at least, profitoriented—nature. Other industrialized nations’ health care systems tend to
feature deeper government involvement in the provision of care, the regulation
of insurance, and guarantees of access to care. Direct price controls are far
more common. In the United States, the profit motive has a much larger role in
the provision of care. Many changes in the delivery and organization of health
care services over the past two decades have come about in part (and
sometimes, primarily) to boost compensation to top executives and
shareholders of insurers, and well-placed providers.
It is this fundamental clash over values—over whether the profit motive and
markets should play a larger or smaller role in U.S. health care—that rhetoric of
“cost containment” tries to smooth over. Settling this key question will, in turn,
depend on fine-grained analyses of diverse actors in the U.S. health care system.
The next section frames a research agenda for such analyses, highlighting the
importance of raising returns to undercompensated providers of care, even if
there is a fair amount of waste by other providers.
III
TOWARD A MORE TEXTURED ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CARE EXPENSES
Aggregate health spending figures are problematic. Such figures roll
together expenditures on items that have been overpriced (like the drug
Zaltrap, which was initially priced twice as high as Avastin with little to no
18
discernible advantage over the older drug) with other interventions that are
underfunded (like health information technology, personalized medicine, home
19
health aides, care coordination, public health measures, and preventive care).
They combine extraordinary profits and executive incomes together with the
pittances paid to vital workers in the sector. To achieve a more textured and
accurate view, where health care funds are being spent must be considered as
well as who is benefiting from those expenditures and what the distribution of
income is across health subsectors.
Given careful consideration of the full range of real health care costs (and
their benefits), it is by no means clear that the United States is “spending too
18. See Paul Goldberg, MSKCC Bars Zaltrap From Formulary, Triggering Debate Over Drug
Pricing, 38 THE CANCER LETTER 1, 1–2 (2012); Matthew Herper, Sanofi’s CEO On The New York
Times’ Criticism of Drug Prices And Surviving The Patent Cliff, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2012, 10:14 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/10/26/sanofis-ceo-on-the-new-york-times-criticism-ofdrug-prices-and-surviving-the-patent-cliff/; Andrew Pollack, Sanofi Halves Price of Cancer Drug
Zaltrap After Sloan-Kettering Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, at B3.
19. For an analysis of the undervaluation of home health care, see ROBERT KUTTNER, OBAMA’S
CHALLENGE 146–53 (2012) (calling for professionalization and pay increases in the sector).
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much” on all forms of health care. As Enthoven and Kronick noted in 1989, the
American health care system is a “paradox of excess and deprivation,” far more
20
in need of redistribution of expenditures than overall cuts.
Hospitals exemplify the problem. They occupy an odd place in health
reform literature. For many cost-cutters, they are public enemy number one:
21
sites of unforgivable waste and unwise cross-subsidization. And yet
policymakers are also counting on them to deliver “health system
transformation,” via initiatives ranging from accountable care organizations to
patient-centered medical homes. These two strands of advocacy could combine
into a seamless garment, if hectoring over high costs inevitably spurred hustle to
improve services. Unfortunately, hospitals may need to invest much more in
information technology (IT) and innovative care delivery now in order to save
money in the future. Cutting spending on, say, health IT, over the next few
years may make it impossible to carry out the type of comparative effectiveness
research and quality improvement strategies that would avoid unnecessary
expense in the future.
The real challenge for health policy is to better match the economic returns
to health interventions to the benefit they provide. At present, for many
interventions, it is hard to determine whether they reliably increase length and
quality of life. In advertising, this has been a familiar problem: in the preInternet age, it was often said that “half of ad spending is wasted; we just don’t
know which half.” With the rise of Google, Facebook, and sophisticated ad
networks, that is less and less true: databases record click-through rates and
track customer engagement with ever more specificity. But unlike Silicon
Valley’s hypertechnologized world of online ad delivery, health care IT is mired
22
in interoperability problems. Moreover, even if these IT problems were
overcome tomorrow, the world of health care outcomes is far more difficult to
measure than the usual tasks of the Internet economy. Google can quickly
determine whether, say, a blue background for ads leads to more clicks than a
grey background. But how easily can a given hospital, or many hospitals,
combine data to assess the effect of changing practice patterns? Finally, the
relative value of various health care outcomes can be contestable, as
controversy over Oregon’s famous Medicaid rationing experiment showed.
There is some hope that a combination of health information exchange,
interoperability advances, and more widespread adoption of learning health

20. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s, 320 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 29, 29 (1989).
21. On the role of cross-subsidization, see see Frank Pasquale, Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars,
in FRAGMENTATION IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 236 (Einer Elhauge, ed., 2010).
22. Susan D. Hall, Poor interoperability a significant barrier for ACOs, FIERCEHEALTHIT,
http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/poor-interoperability-significant-barrier-acos/2014-09-25
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2014); Susan D. Hall, ACOs' Health IT Capabilities Remain Tudimentary,
FIERCEHEALTHIT, (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/acos-health-it-capabilitiesremain-rudimentary/2014-08-13.
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care system models will lead to the types of personalized medicine that can
maintain or promote quality while cutting costs. The HITECH Act of 2009 has
advanced adoption of health information technology, and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) prescribed accountable care
organizations (among many other programs) to encourage data-driven
23
evaluation of health care. Nevertheless, there is still a great distance between
the rhetoric of books like The End of Illness and the more mundane realities of
24
health information sharing. Indeed, dozens of humbler interventions designed
merely to stop errors remain inexcusably underutilized in most hospitals. If
there is not strong demand for existing technologies of harm reduction, it is
hard to see insurers driving far more ambitious innovation.
Indeed, some safety net hospitals seem desperate for cash infusions to
maintain basic care. In 2008, a report on the Grady Memorial Hospital in
Atlanta revealed that:
Every week or so, a vehicle simply gives out while in transit, and [the supervisor] prays
that the patient will not die before she can orchestrate a rescue. . . . The orthopedic
department has a waiting list for elective procedures that one doctor quantified as
“infinity.” Its doctors intermittently instruct other departments to not send them
25
patients.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was widely hailed as financial salvation for
such hospitals since it was supposed to provide Medicaid coverage for a high
proportion of the poor uninsured. But the Supreme Court insisted that states
had the right not to implement that part of the ACA and to stick with the old
26
“categorical eligibility” design of Medicaid. Even worse, in part to satisfy the
technocratic cost-cutters at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and in the
Obama Administration, the ACA cut Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH)
payments to hospitals like Grady on the assumption that the revenues from the
population covered by the Medicaid expansion would make up the lost
27
payments. So now Grady and similarly situated hospitals must make do with
declining DSH payments and less than the promised Medicaid expansion.
Even in states that are expanding Medicaid, many hospitals are at the
23. Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72
Maryland Law Review 682, 728 (2013).
24. DAVID B. AGUS, THE END OF ILLNESS 3 (2011) (“The end of illness is closer than you
think.”).
25. Shaila Dewan & Kevin Sack, A Safety-Net Hospital Falls Into Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/us/08grady.html.
26. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2601–07 (2012).
27. The CBO deserves special censure for its role as an ideological “enforcer” of cost-cutting,
systematically skewing legislators against government action, and under-recognizing the value of
relieving suffering, offering security, and enriching the health and education of citizens. For the CBO,
the working poor, the uninsured, and students are systematically undervalued. See Will Bunch,
America’s Cruel Political Math—Where the Working Poor Equal Less Than Zero, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 25, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/will-bunch/minimum-wage-workingpoor_b_4844606.html; Frank Pasquale, Politicized Prognostication at CBO, BALKINIZATION (July 28,
2009), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/07/politicized-prognostication-at-cbo.html.
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breaking point. As one New York hospital executive observed, community
hospitals have “cut costs on staffing and support services,” and stopped
“spending money to keep . . . physical plant[] and equipment up to date,” to the
extent that “[t]he condition of the physical plants of many New York City
28
hospitals is staggering.”
When local hospitals close, the resulting
unemployment devastates local economies and sometimes leaves the critically
29
ill with very long ambulance rides to emergency care. A new online game
dramatizes the situation, “[h]aving players experience the anxiety of seeing a
victim with no hospitals nearby” in order to give “them an intuitive and
memorable understanding of how the lack of emergency care affects
30
neighborhoods.”
For now, the worst deprivation resulting from health care cost-cutting
afflicts the poorest parts of the United States the most. But the reduction in
hospital facilities and other resources, although “efficient” in normal times, may
prove disastrous if there is an epidemic. For example, one nationalpreparedness plan for pandemic flu estimated that, in a worst-case scenario, the
31
United States would be short over 600,000 ventilators. “To some experts, the
ventilator shortage is the most glaring example of the country’s lack of
32
readiness for a pandemic,” one journalist noted. The lack of “surge capacity”
throughout the health care industry is a major infrastructural shortcoming,
33
likely to cause tremendous, avoidable suffering if a pandemic emerges.
In the hoped-for world of the health care cost-cutter, doctors will scale back
their own demands for reimbursement to match patients’ ability to pay, if only
policymakers would bite the bullet and reduce patients’ effective purchasing
34
power. Unfortunately, this “just-so” story has little foundation in actual studies
of the redistributive effects of ending subsidies. It is hard to know whether the
reduced purchasing power of working people (or their employers) would
actually (motivate insurers to) force physicians and pharmaceutical firms to
35
accept lower prices. If offered lower prices from ordinary working people,

28. Mark Levine, St. Vincent’s is the Lehman Brothers of Hospitals, N.Y. MAG.Oct. 17, 2010,
http://nymag.com/news/features/68991/ (quoting a hospital executive).
29. See Jon Nichol et al., The Relationship Between Distance to Hospital and Patient Mortality in
Emergencies: An Observational Study, 24 EMERGENCY MED. J. 665 (2007).
30. Sisi Wei et al., HeartSaver: Experimenting with News Games to Tell a Story, PROPUBLICA
(Apr. 23, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.propublica.org/nerds/item/heartsaver-an-experiment-in-usingnews-games-to-tell-a-story.
31. Don McNeil, Hospitals Short on Ventilators if Bird Flu Hits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/national/12vent.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1142295570FVGWQZzHnI8Qy0EO3+gKUA&pagewanted=print.
32. Id.
33. Vickie J. Williams, Fluconomics: Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During and After a
Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 132 (2007).
34. Joseph Bankman et al., Reforming the Tax Preference for Employer Health Insurance, in TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 43, 43–44 (2012) (alleging negative effects of ESI).
35. White, infra note 69, at 42.
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doctors may simply switch their efforts to high-end, cash-only boutique, or
36
concierge, practices. Magazines like Medical Economics constantly suggest
37
ways for physicians to maximize cash flow. Indeed, both trade journalists and
economists have recognized the pervasiveness of physicians’ income
38
maintenance. Like a balloon that, when squeezed in one part, pops out in
39
another, physician incomes have a way of maintaining their overall volume.
Macrolevel analyses of health expenditures also need to contextualize
physician compensation. Given the rapid rise of both incomes and wealth
among the top 1% (and especially top 0.1%) of taxpayers, it should not be
surprising when even the highest-paid physicians fight to maintain their relative
position. A typical American orthopedist may make twice or three times what a
Belgian orthopedist earns but is paid a trivial sum compared to many rentiers
and managers with better working conditions, less educational investment, and
less contribution to social welfare. Moreover, given the political influence of
money, the outsized salaries of these financiers and CEOs do not merely mean
that they enjoy more consumer goods. Rather, to the extent health care
providers have less money to invest in campaigns and lobbying, they consign
themselves to losing out in future political battles over the relative allocation of
health care dollars among managers, investors, and providers. In an era of
unconstrained campaign spending, investing in politicians is a critical business
40
strategy.
36. See Peter A. Clark et al., Concierge Medicine: Medical, Legal and Ethical Perspectives, 7
INTERNET J.L. HEALTHCARE & ETHICS 1, 1 (2010), available at http://ispub.com/IJLHE/7/1/7969;
Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 269, 282
(2010); Frank Pasquale, Three Faces of Retainer Care, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 39, 41
(2007).
37. See Frank Cohen, Lines of Credit: A Tool to Boost Reserves and Sustain Cash Flow at Your
Practice, MED. ECON. (Apr. 24, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medicaleconomics/content/tags/cash-flow/lines-credit-tool-boost-reserves-and-sustain-cash-flow-your; Marisa
Manley, Using Your Office Lease to Manage Cash Flow, MED. ECON. (May 23, 2014),
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/cash-flow/using-youroffice-lease-manage-cash-flow; Stanley M. Smith II & Matthew Frooman, Selling Your Practice:
Planning Is Crucial-How to Maximize After-Tax Cash Flow, MED. ECON. (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/modernmedicine/modernmedicine-feature-articles/selling-your-practice-plannin?page=full; Christina Van Vort, How Physicians
Can Improve Cash Flow with Accounts Receivable Financing, MED. ECON. (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/accountsreceivable/how-physicians-can-improve-cash-flow-accounts-rec.
38. See, e.g., Lori Melichar, The effect of reimbursement on medical decision making: Do physicians
alter treatment in response to a managed care incentive?, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 902, 906 (2009) (finding
that physicians “with capitated care contracts make treatment decisions that are not inconsistent with
profit-maximization”); Karen Nash, Urologists Struggle to Make up for Lost Reimbursement,
UROLOGY TIMES, June 2005, at 38 (discussing the ways urologists attempted to maintain their incomes
in response to Medicaid reimbursement cuts).
39. The phenomenon may express itself either as a maintenance of overall income, or income per
patient or per hour. See, e.g., Jack Hadley & Jean M. Mitchell, Effects of HMO Market Penetration on
Physicians’ Work Effort and Satisfaction, 16 HEALTH AFF. 99, 109 (1997).
40. See generally JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: HOW CONSERVATIVES
ABANDONED THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD TOO (2008); G. RICHARD SHELL,
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The financing of medical education (and even of medical residencies) also
helps explain why American physicians demand more pay than those in other
nations with similar levels of professionalism and health outcomes. Medical
school in the United States leaves many of its doctors far deeper in debt at the
beginning their careers than comparable professionals elsewhere. For example,
if a primary care physician is using forty percent of her income to pay student
debt and interest on a mortgage, we may wonder whether the differential
between what she makes and the lower pay she would likely earn in another
advanced country is really a problem of a wasteful health care sector, or, at least
in part, a problem of U.S. patterns of financing education and housing. Leaving
physicians hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt at the beginning of their
careers is penny-wise and pound-foolish: it saves funds now, but pressures
doctors to maximize incomes as rapidly as possible to pay back loans.
Finally, close consideration of the potentially self-defeating role of private
insurers as gatekeeping cost-cutters is crucial. U.S. doctors spend four times as
41
much money on interactions with insurers as Canadian doctors. Multispecialty
group practices “spend 13.9% of revenues for billing- and insurance-related
42
overhead.” Private health insurers were supposed to control costs, and did play
some role in doing so in the 1990s, but they have lately come to be seen as cost
centers themselves. The ACA now imposes a medical loss ratio (MLR) rule to
limit most insurers’ administrative take to fifteen to twenty percent of
43
premiums paid. But insurers may respond by increasing premiums to expand
the baseline of funds from which they can draw that fifteen or twenty percent. If
that happens, the MLR may end up yet another futile technocratic cog in our
44
health system’s Rube Goldberg machine of cost containment.
IV
REVALUING VS. DEVALUING HEALTH CARE
Shimon Peres once observed that, when a problem cannot be solved, it is no
45
longer a problem—it is a fact. For many Americans, mortgage payments or
MAKE THE RULES OR YOUR RIVALS WILL (2004).
41. Dante Morra et al., US Physician Practices Versus Canadians: Spending Nearly Four Times As
Much Money Interacting With Payers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1443, 1443 (2011). For concrete examples of the
inefficiencies involved, see Steven P. Ringel, Practicing Medicine Versus Pushing Paper, 30 HEALTH
AFF. 1200, 1200–03 (2011).
42. Ray E. Drasga & Lawrence H. Einhorn, Why Oncologists Should Support Single Payer
National Health Insurance, J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. (2013), available at http://org.salsalabs.com/o/307/
images/Drasga%20Einhorn%20authors%20proof-edited%20%281%29.pdf.
43. Medical Loss Ratio, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES,
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/Medical-LossRatio.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
44. See Mike Konczal, What Kind of Problem is the ACA Rollout for Liberalism?, NEXT NEW
DEAL (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/what-kind-problem-aca-rolloutliberalism.
45. Sharon’s Victory, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2001, at A26 (“If a problem has no solution, it may not
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high cable bills or bank fees are simply assumed as an inevitable part of
contemporary civilization, whereas health costs are politicized, manipulable,
and thus more objectionable. For example, in Deadly Spin, ex-insurance
executive Wendell Potter describes a struggling middle class family’s financial
travails as follows:
[The Brennan family is] thinking now that they would be better off without insurance.
They pay more than $7,000 a year in premiums and still have almost $11,000 in
combined deductibles—and they have to pay the full cost of prescription drugs
because medications are not covered under either of their policies. “Because of the
high deductibles, we still wind up paying for everything out of pocket,” said Katie.
“We now avoid going to the doctor. . . . The cost of our premiums and out-of-pocket
46
costs exceed our monthly mortgage payments.”

Two questions immediately arise here. First, why are costs so high? That
should be the first question of health care cost-cutters, not generalizations
about whether the service as a whole costs too much. Second, what are the
proper comparators for health care costs? The Brennans complain that the costs
exceed a mortgage payment—but to what extent is the real estate sector itself
47
inflated by government action? Like medical bills, housing prices are artifacts
of socialized financing mechanisms. Housing also has enormous built-in tax
advantage for the tens of millions of American households that own homes and
are paying a mortgage: the interest payments on the mortgage are taxdeductible. All these subsidies are submerged in ordinary talk about real estate,
which presumes that rents or mortgage payments should be a family’s largest
48
expense.
This is not to say that the Brennans should not be complaining about their
plight: far from it. My position is simply that all wasted spending is relative. In
the aggregate, useless spending on American health care may well surpass the
over $600 billion estimated by Wallace Turbeville to be excessively allocated to
49
the finance sector each year. For example, the Institute of Medicine issued a
report in the fall of 2012 claiming that $750 billion of the $2.6 trillion the United
50
States spent on health care was unnecessary. Nevertheless, even accepting such
be a problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped with over time.”).
46. WENDELL POTTER, DEADLY SPIN 102 (2010).
47. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1103–04 (2009) (describing subsidies to housing market and financial, insurance,
and real estate (FIRE) sector).
48. See generally SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011) (discussing the role of hidden subsidies and
tax discounts in redistributive policies).
49. Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation:
Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (2013); see
also John Quiggin, Wall Street Isn’t Worth It, JACOBIN (2013), available at https://www.jacobinmag.com/
2013/11/wall-street-isnt-worth-it/.
50. See Sarah Kliff, We spend $750 billion on unnecessary health care. Two charts explain why,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
7,
2012,
11:07
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2012/09/07/we-spend-750-billion-on-unnecessary-health-care-two-charts-explain-why/;
The Cost of Health Care: How Much is Waste?, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, http://resources.iom.edu/
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Figure 1
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nt, to make accurate
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erns in 2025,, let alone 20085, is questtionable.
Both the “[cc]urrent law projection” in the chart above and th
he course co
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52
exhibit ill-ad
dvised confid
dence in tecchnocratic exxtrapolation. Their outter limits
widgets/vsrt/hea
althcare-waste.h
html (last visited
d Mar. 29, 2014)..
51. See Ne
eil Irwin, Anotheer billionaire is predicting
p
doom.. Ignore him., WASH. POST (Occt. 23, 2013,
1:36
PM),
http://www.w
washingtonpost.ccom/blogs/wonk
kblog/wp/2013/100/23/another-billlionaire-ism-ignore-him/ (ccritiquing allege
ed “bubbles” in vvarious sectors o
of the economy)).
predicting-doom
52. CHARL
LES TAYLOR, In
nterpretation and
d the Sciences off Man, in PHILO
OSOPHY AND TH
HE HUMAN
SCIENCES 55 (1
1985) (“exact prrediction [in soccial science] is rradically imposssible, for three reasons of
ascending orderr of fundamenta
alness.”)
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are about as scientific as singularitarian predictions of mass immortality by
2100.
Even ostensibly sober analysts have tended to “sound the alarm” on health
care costs with some dubious predictions. For example, the Intermediate
Projections from Annual Reports of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal
Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds
53
have frequently foretold doom for the Medicare Part A Trust Fund. In 1970,
the fund was supposed to be depleted by 1972; doom was just six years away in
54
1993; and in 1998, calamity loomed in 2008. The CBO has also repeatedly
overestimated the budgetary threat posed by rising government spending on
55
health care. Sometimes, these overestimates border on the ghoulish. For
example, the CBO has embraced the concept of “survivors’ costs” in some
56
scoring of legislative proposals. Such analysis essentially values the early death
of a person denied coverage for care as a benefit (or, at least, avoided costs) to
the public fisc. Beyond its defective moral foundations, such cost alarmism can
prove self-undermining by pushing more health care provision into the private
sector, where insurers have repeatedly proven less able to control costs than
57
their purely public-sector counterparts.
The wisest commentators on health care costs concede that “[t]here is, of
58
course, no ‘right’ amount for a society to spend on health care.” Others
nevertheless focus on disparities among nations with similar lifespans as the
59
United States. Clark C. Havighurst has argued that “it is facially troublesome
that health care spending represents one-seventh of GDP in the United States
(even without providing fully for a huge segment of the population) while

53. Kaiser Family Foundation, Rhyme or Reason?: Solvency Projections of the
Medicare Part A Trust Fund, 1970–2010 (2010) (health resource data set compiling intermediate
projections from 1970–2010 Annual Reports of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital
Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds) (on file with author).
54. PATRICIA A. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICARE: INSOLVENCY PROJECTIONS 4
(2013), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20946.pdf
55. See Pasquale, Politicized Prognostication, supra note 27 (discussing examples of the CBO
overestimating health care expenses and the unreliability of CBO estimates).
56. Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J.
1555, 1597 (2007) (quoting CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE 33 (2002), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/39xx/
doc3960/10-30-prescriptiondrug.pdf (In describing why its model included costs but no savings from
new access to pharmaceuticals, the CBO said, inter alia, “[T]o the extent that a drug benefit helps
people live longer, they may consume more health care over their remaining lifetime than they would
have without the benefit.” In other words, it is still cheaper for Medicare beneficiaries to die.).
57. See Frank Pasquale, Health Care Dilemma: Cost Control vs. Profit Maximization,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 10, 2008), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/02/
health_care_cos.html.
58. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Policing Cost Containment: The Medicare Peer Review Organization
Program, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 483, 484 (1991).
59. See id. (comparing the percent of U.S. GDP spent on health care to that of Canada, Germany,
Japan, and the United Kingdom).
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accounting for only a ninth of GDP or less in all other developed nations.” But
the “percentage of overall GDP” alarm has been sounded many times in the
past. For example, in 1980, an economist lamented that “[w]e spend about 9%
61
of our gross national product on personal health care.” He would probably
have predicted disaster for the United States if he knew that the spending level
was on its way up to its current status of about eighteen percent of GDP. But
however badly off the United States may be at present, it is relatively clear that
the crisis was primarily triggered by the financial, not the health, sector. Growth
in health employment over the past decade has been one of the few bright spots
62
in an otherwise gloomy macroeconomic picture. And it would be the height of
insensitivity to tell millions of unpaid family caregivers that they should be
denied some care assistance simply because an abstraction like “health
expenditures” has grown too large.
Societies’ needs and wants change over time. There is little reason to
benchmark proper health care spending levels to some arbitrary year in the
past, or even some arbitrary global benchmark—particularly when U.S. GDP is
higher than that prevailing in so many of the cost-cutters’ favored comparators.
Future increases in health expenditures, and even increases in the share of
national income they consume, do not automatically undermine the typical
63
household’s well-being—and may well enhance it. With a sufficiently long view
of economic transitions, radical changes in societal allocation of resources
appear more natural than ossified stability. If the U.S. workforce in agriculture
could decline precipitously in a matter of decades, why should its labor in health
care not rise by, say, twenty or thirty percent over the course of the twenty-first
century? And why would a corresponding capture of that share of GDP for
such workers be so problematic if it were accompanied by a commensurately
diminishing share for rentiers, landlords, energy barons, and communication
magnates?
Indeed, resisting such a development may prove macroeconomically selfdefeating. To give one striking example: a Rand study recently concluded that
the “total opportunity costs of informal elder-care amount to $522 billion
64
annually.” The study suggests that a combination of unskilled and skilled
60. Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55, 81 (2002). He also notes that“[s]everal whole percentage points of the nation’s gross domestic
product (‘GDP’) are thus diverted wastefully to health care from other uses.” Id. at 79.
61. Ralph L. Andreano, Does America Spend Too Much on Health Care?, 56 BULL. N.Y. ACAD.
MED. 19, 19 (1980), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1808285/pdf/
bullnyacadmed00110-0023.pdf.
62. See Catherine A. Wood, Employment in Health Care: A Crutch for the Ailing Economy During
the 2007-09 Recession, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2011, at 13.
63. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR AMERICA’S
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 74 (2005) (projecting that the typical household is expected to earn $75,000
annually by mid-century and that, even if 25% of that annual income were consumed by insurance and
direct medical expenses, the household would still be better off).
64. A.V. Chari, John Engberg, Kristin Ray, Ateev Mehrotra, The Opportunity Costs of Informal
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replacement care could result in net economic gains for the United States. Such
replacement care would increase “health care costs,” but could lead to net
economic gains overall, particularly for women (who disproportionately
shoulder the burden of unpaid caregiving). A policy debate relentlessly focused
on reducing health expenditures may promote self-defeating savings strategies,
as obvious, immediate savings are eventually overwhelmed by later, hidden
costs. How we choose to measure benefits and costs can spotlight some results
65
and submerge others. Even accounting is political.
The dynamic, long-term effects of short-term cost-cutting measures like
66
consolidation are also understudied. A wave of hospital mergers in the 1990s
67
helped increase concentration in the industry. Merging hospitals probably
68
saved administrative costs and achieved other efficiencies in the short run. But
over time, the biggest hospitals and hospital chains have also leveraged their
69
size into bargaining power vis-à-vis insurers, employers, and patients. Joseph
White has described in grim detail the arms race for size among hospitals and
70
insurers. It is much easier for large insurers to pass along cost increases to
employers than to bargain hard with must-have providers. Massive hospital
systems have unleashed untold ingenuity in figuring out how to bill payers more
71
aggressively for their services. Some have earned their investors princely
72
sums. These outsized returns might be more properly considered finance

Elder-Care in the United States: New Estimates from the American Time Use Survey, HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH, DOI: 10.1111/1475-6773.12238 (2014), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
external_publications/EP66196.html (copy on file with author and shared with journal).
65. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011) (arguing that many upper income individuals do not
realize the extent to which their lifestyles are subsidized by “upside down subsidies,” like the home
mortgage interest deduction, that tend to deliver benefits disproportionately to the wealthiest (who
tend to have the largest mortgages)).
66. See generally FINAL REPORT, NEW JERSEY COMMISSION ON RATIONALIZING HEALTH CARE
RESOURCES (2008), available at http://nj.gov/health/rhc/finalreport/documents/entire_finalreport.pdf .
67. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT, HOW HAS HOSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE 1 (2006), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2006/02/how-has-hospital-consolidationaffected-the-price-and-quality-of.html.

68. For an account of varying strategies of efficiency improvement in hospital reorganization, see
Frank Pasquale, Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars, in FRAGMENTATION IN AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE (Einer Elhauge, ed., 2010).
69. Joseph White, Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, 85 MILBANK Q. 395,
435 (2007).
70. Id. at 419.
71. Julie Creswell & Reed Abelson, Giant Hospital Chain Creates a Windfall for Private Equity,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/business/hca-giant-hospital-chaincreates-a-windfall-for-private-equity.html. Bain Capital and two other private equity firms bought
HCA in 2006, and tripled the value of their holdings in six years. Id. Again, the accounting question
arises: to what extent are HCA’s extraordinary profits health care costs, and to what extent are they
rents to finance?
72. See, e.g., id.
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o
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a
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p
of G
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reasons tha
at, if the Un
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prevailing in
i other hig
gh income industrial d
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expenditure
es on highw
ways, bridgess, tunnels, aand other in
nfrastructuree by 50
percent,” (a
a cost of $100 billion), an
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74
higher teach
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gely lagniapp
pe for the top 10% (and especially to
op 1% and 00.1%) of
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families. The
T
median family may
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73. As sch
holars like Greta Krippner hav
ve observed, thee definition of financial return
ns has long
been contested in the relevantt economic, sociiological, and h
historical literatu
ures. Greta Krip
ppner, The
financialization of the America
an economy, SOC
CIO - ECONOMIIC REVIEW, May
y 2005 (describiing at least
three definition
ns of financializa
ation).
74. Victor R. Fuchs, How
w to Shave $1 Trrillion Out of H
Health Care, N.Y
Y. TIMES, Mar. 114, 2014, at
http://economix
x.blogs.nytimes.ccom/2014/03/14//how-to-shave-1 -trillion-out-of-h
health-care/?_r=
=0.
75. For just one of many
y examples, seee David Akadjiian, How Ohio Pulled $4 Billlion+ from
Communities and Redistributed It Upw
wards, DAILY KOS (Feb. 26, 2014, 5::36 AM),
ykos.com/story//2014/02/26/1275
5645/-How-Ohio
o-Pulled-4-Billio
on-from-Commu
unitieshttp://www.daily
and-Redistributted-It-Upwards#
#.
Figure 2
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whatever 1% or so of their income works out to, but that may be cold comfort if
one of them finds herself consigned to a hollowed-out tier of a health care
system highly stratified by cost-cutting.
For many of the health care cost-cutters, it is simply obvious that any money
saved on health care would go to more socially valuable ends. Employersponsored insurance is one example: cost-cutters simply assume that most of the
money saved would go to workers to spend on what they will. Rarely, if ever, is
it acknowledged that, in the current climate of mass un- and underemployment,
employers themselves are likely to keep the money. The average employee has
76
little to no bargaining power.
Health care cost-cutters may claim that the firms’ residual claimants to
returns on equity deserve ever-larger shares of revenues relative to the
providers and insurers the firms directly and indirectly pay for health care. So
what is wrong with piling more funds into corporate cash piles? Consider the
distribution of financial assets, like shares in firms, in U.S. society. As of 2010,
about 85% of financial wealth was held by only 10% of Americans; the top 1%
77
owned a staggering 34% of financial wealth. Should we really be rushing to
reallocate money from home health aides, nurses, physicians, pharmacists,
dentists, and drug researchers to the small fraction of Americans who own most
financial assets?
Some of those with the most financial wealth are using their resources to
promote political programs that advocate for slashing Medicare and Medicaid
to “cut the deficit,” while they rarely, if ever, broach the possibility of taxing the
78
wealthiest at rates that prevailed in the United States as recently as the 1950s.
Initiatives to cut health care costs are often less a neutral, technocratic project
of rationalizing public expenditure than one cog in a larger machine of upward
wealth redistribution: away from patients and professionals on the frontlines of
care, to an investor class that can pay for the best health care in the world
without any public help or insurance pool to supplement their purchasing
power.
Popular as it may be among technocrats, the deficit reduction narrative has
already failed once before. Former President Bill Clinton helped engineer a
balanced budget in the late 1990s, and even experienced a federal budget
surplus. The next administration promptly squandered that money on tax cuts
76. See David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Regressivity of Taxing Employer-Paid
Health Insurance, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. e101, e101 (2009).
77. G.
William
Domhoff,
Wealth,
Income,
and
Power,
at
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html. On this page, Figure 1: Net worth and
financial wealth distribution in the U.S. in 2010 shows that the top 10% of households (with a mean net
worth of about $2 million) have 85% of financial wealth in the United States. Id. Wealth has only
become more concentrated since then.
78. Such programs include Fix the Debt, The Can Kicks Back, or others from the billionaire Pete
Peterson’s Institute for International Economics. See FIX THE DEBT, http://www.fixthedebt.org/ (last
visited July 27, 2014); THE CAN KICKS BACK, http://www.thecankicksback.org/ (last visited July 27,
2014).
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primarily benefitting the wealthiest and, a bit later, a multitrillion dollar
commitment in Iraq. If the ACA does manage to cut federal health care
budgets by 2020, America may well see surpluses again turned into deficits in
ill-fated military campaigns. Simply “cutting deficits,” without some positive
and durable sense of where the money is going, merely gives hostages to
fortune.
It would be far better to redirect current energies in health care cost-cutting
toward quality improvement, which would both cut wasteful spending and
redirect that saved money (and perhaps other funds) to the multiple
underserved populations now documented in health disparities literatures, and
the many initiatives in personalized medicine, health IT, and medical research
that are now inadequately funded. For example, the United States is rapidly
running out of effective antibiotics, leading some experts to worry about the
advent of a postantibiotic era where minor wounds could spiral into long
79
hospital stays, or even death, for those infected with drug-resistant microbes.
Spending more on antibiotic research now could prevent far more costs in the
future.
It is not just drug research that suffers in a health austerity regime.
80
Governmental refusals to pay for current drugs may backfire, too. If a high copay leads a congestive heart failure patient to skip critical medications, she
might end up in an emergency department—a far costlier intervention. Finally,
the recent rise of drug shortages should be a cautionary tale for anyone hoping
that market forces will enforce just-in-time production patterns that minimize
81
costs in other industries. A disrupted supply chain in car parts can cause
remediable inconvenience. Shortages of critical drugs, by contrast, threaten to
impose irreparable harm on those in need of treatment while rationing (or
improvisation with second-best treatment regimens) must occur.
B. Health Macroeconomics
The health care sector is also anchoring the economic future of many
regions. For many American urbanists and economic planners, the keys to the
future of growth are “meds and eds.” Cities and regions with thriving
universities and hospitals could emulate Pittsburgh, Ann Arbor, and other cities
which have bounced back from manufacturing’s decline. On this vision,
79. See Tom Worstall, Why We’re Running Out of Antibiotics is an Economic Problem, Not a
Medical
or
Pharmaceutical
One,
FORBES
(MAY
3,
2014,
12:15
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/05/03/why-were-running-out-of-antibiotics-is-aneconomic-problem-not-a-medical-or-pharmaceutical-one/; Anita Manning, ‘Superbugs’ Spread Fear Far
and Wide, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at A1.
80. Joel Lexchin, Prescribing Errors, 172 CMAJ 1503, 1504 (2005) (“[W]hen New Hampshire put
a cap on the monthly number of prescriptions that welfare recipients would get for free, the result was
an increase in nursing home admissions that probably cost the state government as much as it saved on
drug costs.”).
81. Sharona Hoffman, The Drugs Stop Here: A Public Health Framework to Address the Drug
Shortage Crisis, 67 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 1, 4–5 (2012).
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decently paid human services in the medical and education sectors could sustain
employment and spark innovation.
George Mason University economist Tyler Cowen offers a radically
different vision in his recent book Average Is Over, revealing a troubling
82
endgame for neoliberal health cost cutting. For Cowen, current trends toward
economic inequality will swamp the meds and eds trend. There will be a
prosperous class of the top ten or fifteen percent of society making over one
million dollars a year, and a huge underclass with far fewer resources than the
median household of today. Asked by a skeptical radio journalist how this
transition would transpire in the United States without mass resistance or
discontent, he nonchalantly points to income levels prevailing in poorer
precincts of Latin America as a potential equilibrium point for the broad
83
American middle class. Pressed to discuss the possibility of redistribution,
Cowen dismissed it, pointing to the quiescence of the average U.S. citizen and
84
the increasing influence of the very wealthy over the political process. Instead,
he has urged policymakers to focus their attention on reducing the costs of
health care and education, in order to preserve some level of access to these
necessities to a radically poorer middle class.
Cowen frames his position as a tough realism, a reluctant recognition of
hard economic realities of scarcity. Yet there are many contestable links in the
chains of causation that health care cost-cutters would use to justify binding the
growth of health care spending. As long as there are hundreds of U.S.
billionaires, thousands of hecto-millionaires, and trillions of dollars hidden
offshore, throwing off untold (and improperly untaxed) sums for their wily
owners, some funds are available to cover health cost overruns. America’s top
one percent—enjoying over ninety percent of economic gains for years now,
and a vastly disproportionate share of economic growth since 1980—cannot
forever keep accumulating wealth without returning some fair share to
accommodate the needs of the other 99%.
The more foresighted among them must also realize that, at the end of the
day, the most important threats to their own well-being—debilitating
sicknesses, in the form of either acute or chronic disease—can only be
82. See TYLER COWEN, AVERAGE IS OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE AGE OF THE
GREAT STAGNATION (2013); Tyler Cowen, Our Economic Problems Are in Sectors, Not the System,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/30/was-marxright/our-economic-problems-are-in-sectors-not-the-system (describing a “health care system which
combines the worst properties of public and private sector incentives, leading to more expensive service
and lower quality and access”).
83. Economist Tyler Cowen on the End of Average, ON POINT (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://onpoint.wbur.org/2013/09/16/economist-tyler-cowen-on-the-end-of-average.
84. Id. Operating from a very different set of assumptions, Sheldon Wolin would probably come to
a similar conclusion. See Sheldon Wolin, Inverted Totalitarianism: How the Bush Regime is Effecting the
Transformation to a Fascist-Like State, NATION, (May 1, 2003), http://www.thenation.com/
article/inverted-totalitarianism# (“[I]nverted totalitarianism wants a politically demobilized society that
hardly votes at all.”).
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alleviated, deflected, or delayed. Having hundreds of times more wealth than
others is no route to a life hundreds of times longer. Indeed, the opposite may
well be true: The uncared-for poor may be more likely to harbor or spread
antibiotic-resistant microbes or viral contagions to others than they would be if
they received adequate and timely health care. To the extent it worsens the fate
of the one percent, health care cost-cutting may be a lose–lose game. Out-ofcontrol contagions would swamp whatever welfare gains the wealthy enjoy from
persuading politicians to cut their taxes.
Even if gated communities can guard the very wealthy from contagious
disease, the upper classes still will need to rely on a larger health care system
sustained by mass participation and demand. It is hard to imagine individuals,
or even wealthy groups, stockpiling all drugs they might need, particularly the
sterile injectables or biotech solutions that are critical to advanced medicine.
Even the very wealthy must rely on a steady, more general demand for these
products. They cannot just order them for instant delivery via Amazon. Public
subvention—ranging from research grants to Medicare and Medicaid funding
for the products research generates—provides that demand. Cutting it by
providing ever-more tax breaks for the wealthy is an astonishingly short-sighted
strategy, even for the richest.
V
CONCLUSION
Cost-cutting is a conveniently flexible summum bonum that can hide the
often brutally reallocative measures taken to financialize health systems (that is,
to maximize their ability to deliver returns to investors) or tier them (in order to
stratify quality and availability of care on the basis of ability and willingness to
pay). If the health care cost-cutters had a plan for reallocating excess health
sector spending to pay for care that is now undercompensated or absent, they
would merit the influence they have now achieved. But in reality, money freed
up by cost-cutting is much more likely to be retained as profit or claimed by
capital and rentiers in some other way. The “customer” for many private
insurers is the corporation buying coverage for its employees, not the
employees themselves (the insured). Reduce the cost of such insurance in an
era of mass un- and under-employment, and guess who will capture those
funds? One does not need to read Kalecki to guess which way the money flows.
The cost-containment consensus obscures these unpleasant realities. It is an
ideological touchstone of U.S. health care and key to reducing the field to a
technocratic object. Establishment economists alarmedly pronounce on the
horrors of spending over seventeen percent of GDP on health care, ignoring the
repeated falsifications of predictions of doom when health expenditures as a
percentage of GDP passed other, arbitrary thresholds. Health policymakers
nevertheless tend to accept that framing, and busy themselves with finding the
most wasteful providers. They rarely consider whether the outlier dermatologist
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making $900,000 a year is as much of a misallocation of resources as, say, the
hedge fund managers making hundreds of millions of dollars in a single year, or
85
ever more richly compensated top managers and private equity firms. A
goodly number of billionaires richly fund austerity-promoting think tanks that
keep public debates focused on cost-cutting, rather than fairer pay for
undercompensated health workers.
Technocrats may cast my arguments as a “rhetoric of reaction” that
overemphasizes the perverse and futile consequences of cost-cutting, unfairly
86
occluding its more positive effects. But the question of emphasis may just as
easily be reversed. In their eagerness to “rationalize” the health-delivery
system, cost-cutters overlook (and threaten to wreck) the delicate ecology of
current health care finance. My conservatism merely turns the rationalizing
impulse of cost-cutting on itself: demanding that neoliberals show more
evidence of the success of cost-cutting before erecting ever higher burdens of
87
documentation (or ill-considered incentive schemes) for health care providers.
Cost-cutters constantly evoke waste and fraud as their targets, but their
program also has real human costs. In The Body Economic, David Stuckler and
Sanjay Basu demonstrate that endless pressure to cut public spending—
including health spending—has directly impacted life expectancy in Europe’s
88
periphery. In the United States, new data shows that in many areas, white
89
women’s life expectancy has gone down by close to five years. Once insurance
and care become scarce or burdensome to seek out, people who are sickened by
lack of health insurance, or are too hard-pressed to participate in politics, are in
no position to fight back against the austerity juggernaut. Nor are they able to
fight effectively for one policy that would have a decent chance of cutting costs
while improving quality: a public option like Medicare for anyone without
decent employer coverage.
Having dismissed such real reforms as utopian nullities, neoliberals’
preferred brand of “cost-cutting” continues to dominate American health
policy. The longer it holds sway, the more profit-driven, rather than patientdriven, care promises to dominate the health care landscape. Financiers will

85. LAWRENCE MISHEL & ALYSSA DAVIS, ECON.
AS TYPICAL WORKERS ARE PAID LESS (June 12, 2014).

POLICY INST., CEO PAY CONTINUES TO RISE

86. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY
(1991).
87. As G.A. Cohen has observed, “with historical working class gains in place, small-c
conservatism becomes a buffer against inequality. For the sake of protecting and extending the powers
of wealth, big-C Conservatives [i.e., members of parties of the right] regularly sacrifice the small-c
conservatism that many of them genuinely cherish.” G.A. Cohen, A Truth in Conservatism: Rescuing
Conservatism from the Conservatives 35 (A1-2004 Conservatism Workshop, 2004), available at
https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/workshop-materials/pt_cohen.pdf.
88. See generally DAVID STUCKLER & SANJAY BASU, THE BODY ECONOMIC: WHY AUSTERITY
KILLS (2013).
89. Emily Shire, The Mysterious Decline in Female Life Expectancy, THE WEEK (Oct. 9, 2013),
http://theweek.com/article/index/250795/the-mysterious-decline-in-female-life-expectancy.
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continue to wrest more control of the sector from physicians, nurses, scientists,
and other frontline innovators and providers of care. Without a far more
textured analysis of how dollars now devoted to health care can be better spent,
rather than merely not spent, a dark future of stratification and
deprofessionalization is all but assured.
There is an alternative. Direct state investment in new technologies would
advance all three of the “triple aims” of health policy (cost containment,
90
enhancement of quality, and expanding access to care). Fully funding the Food
and Drug Administration would help identify which interventions really work
91
and which are mere money-spinners. Gradually expanding Medicare eligibility
could lead to real competition for the private plans now offered on the ACA’s
exchanges. Investment in learning health care systems and health data
interoperability would provide a better infrastructure for medical research.
Extensive training programs and fairer pay could lead to true
professionalization of home health aides—workers now burdened with
generally low pay and dismal prospects for career advancement.
These goals may seem unrealistic now. But until our health policymakers
directly aim for them, we will be at the mercy of a cost-containment model as
flawed as pre-Copernican, geocentric astronomy. We can continue to add
epicycles of exchanges, subsidies, risk corridors, navigators, clawbacks, and
auditors to paper over the flaws in this neoliberal model of “health reform.” Or
we can invest directly in patient-centered care. It may not cut costs, but over the
long term, what could better assure Americans’ productivity and well-being?

90. See generally MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC
VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013).
91. See BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND
HARM PATIENTS 1–11 (2012) (discussing the problems associated with industry-funded testing); Frank
Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV.
668–772 (collecting studies on secrecy in the health context).

